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truth is always, ultimately, a set of "arbitrary metaphors" that are subject to "the legislature of language" and not to the thing in itself ("On Truth" 177, 176). As we know, the kind of thing Nietzsche says about the nature of language and its consequences gets formalized into structuralist linguistics by Ferdinand de Saussure, and then of course such thinkers as Jacques Derrida come along to show how this structuralism in its turn undoes its own attempts at grounding language.
Historically we have two primary responses to the kind of thinking that Nietzsche most fully sets into motion. The first, which we associate more with naturalism and modernism in literature, involves nihilism. As I have argued elsewhere, one ready reaction to Nietzschean claims is a leap to the conclusion that there is no truth at all, that the truth in general is simply an illusion or a batch of lies perpetrated by whoever happens to have power (Jackson 33-37). And even Nietzsche himself falls into this at times. But this nihilistic conclusion is in fact the same kind of absolute truth claim that Nietzsche's arguments disallow. Only in relation to some absolutely true truth could you judge the truth in general to be a lie; but Nietzsche's arguments rule out such an absolutely true truth. If we do not think his claims through thoroughly, we can easily and without realizing it end up judging the new idea of truth by the standard of the old idea of truth that we have agreed has been disproved by, precisely, the new. This latter is what nihilism always unwittingly does.
"Postmodernism" is one way of describing the second primary response to Nietzsche. And despite the fact that it has been regularly attacked as nihilistic, postmodernism constitutes itself in part through the recognition of that which nihilism misses in Nietzschean claims about the nature of truth. For in fact Nietzsche only shows the unsustainability of certain kinds of truth, namely those that present themselves as entirely self-consistent, eternal, changeless, outside of history and desire. Postmodern understandings do not find the truth in general to be simply false, nor the world to be meaningless; rather, we have truth and meaning in a different way than had previously most commonly been thought. The postmodern project involves the investigation of how actual truths have been constituted in actual historical situations. More theoretical writers, such as Derrida, Paul de Man, Jacques Lacan, and Michel Foucault, have become famous for revealing certain large-scale linguistic or psychological or discursive structures that have operated toward the production of ostensibly universal, self-evident truths. Most of the practical interpretive activities-that is, certain feminisms, new historicism, postcolonial studies, cultural studies, and so forth-that would fall into the postmodern category have tended to show how desire or ideology of whatever kind has produced truths in specific cultural settings.
But although Nietzsche and postmodernism do not destroy the truth and meaning in general, they end up leaving us with a truth and meaning that seem for many people unsatisfying in fundamental ways. Evidently our desire is always, impossibly enough, for the absolute, and we are disappointed with anything less. What are the consequences for everyday life if Nietzschean or postmodern understandings are true? After all, it is one thing to demonstrate logically the end of absolute truths or grounds or centers or selves, but it is another thing to live life without them. Banville's work has considered just this situation, specifically in the context of scientific kinds of knowledge. If we look over a series of his most recent novels, we find that Banville gives us a kind of history. In several earlier novels he imagines what we now see as postmodern understandings of knowledge appearing individually to an array of great Renaissance scientific thinkers. It is as if the most intense thinking will naturally tend to press ever onward until it strikes the kinds of perimeters that postmodernism has taken as its center of interest. And this makes sense. Postmodern conceptuality is not in some radical way unprecedented. Of course thinkers have run up on all this before. But though postmodern conceptuality is not new in itself, it is historically significant that it has now spread into a wide array of intellectual arenas and even into everyday life. And it is this latter case that Banville considers in his more recent books, particularly The Book of Evidence and Ghosts, at which I will look in most detail.
A string of three books-Doctor Copernicus (1976), Kepler (1981, winner of the Guardian Prize for fiction), and The Newton Letter (1982)-most established Banville's international reputation. The first two of these are fictional biographies of the real historical figures. Banville portrays both men as having an almost religious conception of mathematics and geometry, as being possessed by the but his calling as a historian. A key document in his research, one of Newton's letters to John Locke, turns out to "lie at the centre of [the unnamed narrator's own] work" (58). Paradoxically though, in the letter Newton has come to the margins of his own circle of knowledge. After arguing with Locke about some of the grounding claims of the Principia, Newton abruptly turns away from the subject of science, formulas, and laws to speak of everyday people: "They would seem to have something to tell me; not of their trades, nor even of how they conduct their lives; nothing, I believe, in words. They are ... themselves the things they might tell. They are all a form of saying." Therefore, he continues, "expect no more philosophy from my pen. The language in which I might be able not only to write but to think is neither Latin nor English, but a language none of whose words is known to me" (59). No matter his immense successes, in the end the old philosopher finds that the net of his knowledge has failed to capture the essential reality. Newton's recognition of the failure of his scientific knowledge is mirrored in the academic historian's recognition of the failure of history. The narrator has "lost [his] faith in the primacy" of the historical text. "Real people keep getting in the way now, objects, landscapes even" (1). Finally, he simply says, "I can't go on. I'm not a historian anymore" (82).
In his next novel, Mephisto (1986), Banville takes a new tack both stylistically and in terms of his interest in the mathematization of the world. Mephisto is again a fictional autobiography, but written in a surreal style, with a cast of strange, almost figmentary characters and a bizarre plot that slips back and forth between a macabre realism and postmodern science fiction. The main character, Gabriel Swan, is born with a "gift for numbers," able to count before he can talk (18). In fact, Swan's gift is such that he is "at ease only with pure numbers" (21). In contrast with his great Renaissance predecessors, the twentieth-century mathematician does not have to prove any link between mathematics and the material world: he simply assumes it. But he, too, finally sees his desire crack up on the reef of the real. Late in the novel, after the accidental deaths of his mother, father, and uncle, and after being horribly disfigured in a mysterious explosion, he ends up having to abandon the language of mathematics, but he still listens for the voice of the thing itself. "I JACKSON ? 515 woke up one morning," he writes, "and found I could no longer add together two and two. Something had given way, the ice had shattered. Things crowded in, the mere things themselves. One drop of water plus one drop of water will not make two drops, but one. Two oranges and two apples do not make four of some new synthesis, but remain stubbornly themselves" (233). As we have seen, all these novels tell in different ways stories of the same kind of desire and the same kind of failure. Each man, after much study and thought, after producing true and useful knowledge about certain aspects of the world, discovers, typically in a striking flash of realization, that some essential, most basic quality of the real world has slipped through his intellectual embrace, and more specifically has eluded a certain kind of mathematical and/or geometrical formalization. With The Book of Evidence (1989) and Ghosts (1993), we begin where these previous stories end. In fact the thoroughly twentieth century protagonist of these two novels is in many ways the historical result of the Copernican determination to look "unflinchingly upon the world as it is and not as men, out of a desire for reassurance or mathematical elegance or whatever, wished it to be." The Book of Evidence and Ghosts both revolve around a character who lives in a world that in some senses takes for granted the disillusionment with knowledge that had come belatedly to the astronomers.
And just here we may turn to the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche to consider all this, for Banville has represented the desire of scientific knowledge much after Nietzsche's representation of Socratic knowledge in The Birth of Tragedy. There, Socrates is described as operating under a productive illusion: "the unshakable faith that thought, using the thread of logic, can penetrate the deepest abysses of being" (95). And of course this faith has been immensely successful. It has "led science onto the high seas from which it has never again been driven altogether." Alluding to the Copernican revolution, Nietzsche continues that science has cast "a common net of thought over the whole globe, actually holding out the prospect of the lawfulness of an entire solar system" (96). even violent in its desire, this faith, this knowledge cannot rest without roping everything into its domain. "Anyone who has ever experienced the pleasure of Socratic insight and felt how, spreading in ever-widening circles, it seeks to embrace the whole world of appearances, will never again find any stimulus toward existence more violent than the craving to complete this conquest and to weave the net impenetrably tight" (97). Nietzsche himself has of course experienced just this craving, and his philosophical project tries to make sense out of what we know and who we are once we have realized just these truths about Socratic knowledge. Banville has given us portraits of actual men driven with uncommon force to complete the "conquest and to weave the net impenetrably tight." But Nietzsche goes on to claim that "science, spurred by its powerful illusion, speeds irresistibly toward its limits where its optimism, concealed in the essence of logic, suffers shipwreck. For the periphery of the circle of science has an infinite number of points; and while there is no telling how this circle could ever be surveyed completely, noble and gifted men nevertheless reach, e'er half their time and inevitably, such boundary points on the periphery from which one gazes into what defies illumination" (97-98). All this is to say that scientific knowledge has been driven by an at least implicit faith that the world in its entirety can be known within the same kind of knowledge. The "essence of logic" conceals the fact that this is simply a faith or optimism, because logic seems self-evidently to be the infallible means to the whole truth. Nietzsche, however, argues that all logic sooner or later runs into its limit, the point at which it turns back upon itself and fails to maintain itself consistently within its own bases for truth. Just this latter truth about the necessary shipwreck of logic, arrived at through logic itself, is of course the point from which deconstructive and poststructuralist arguments typically take off. For Nietzsche it is at this boundary point, the point at which "logic coils up ... and finally bites its own tail," that a "new form of insight breaks through, tragic insight which, merely to be endured, needs art as a protection and remedy" (98).
Along with the "shipwreck" of knowledge, Banville has considered the dialectical emergence of art out of the failed desire of science, especially in the very last pages of Doctor Copernicus. In his dying moments, Copernicus is visited by the ghost of his ing is not beautiful, nonetheless, "in her portrait she has presence, she is unignorably there, more real than the majority of her sisters out here in what we call real life" (84). Almost instantly Freddie decides he must have the painting. This italicized "thereness," this sense of being fully and uniquely present in space and time, Freddie has never experienced in himself or in others. All his life he has had the "sense of [himself] as something without weight, without moorings, a floating phantom" (Book of Evidence 16). Of his own history, he says, "I was always a little way behind, trotting in the rear of my own life" (38). But the painting brings about a spontaneous experience of fullness in the here and now. As Freddie retells his story in Ghosts, he says of the painting, "It is being that he has encountered here, the thing itself, the pure, unmediated essence, in which, he thinks, he will at last find himself and his true home, his place in the world" (85).
This sense of presence is that aspect of "the thing itself" that has escaped the mathematical grasp of Freddie's predecessors in Banville's work. Given this, and given what Freddie apprehends in the painting, the turn to art begins to look like a means of success, a means of finally fulfilling the most fundamental desire, and so securing a remedy for what he perceives as the disease of existence. But this is not the idea of art Banville is after. In the act of stealing the painting, Freddie is surprised by a flesh-and-blood maid who works at the house. He forces her to leave with him and murders her with a hammer when she tries to escape. In the instant before striking her, Freddie is "filled with a kind of wonder." "I had never," he says, "felt another's presence so immediately and with such raw force. I saw her now, really saw her, for the first time. ... the homelessness of his own sense of self. He could not have seen the painting as he has seen it unless he himself were empty or deficient in a crucial way. Looking back from Ghosts, he will say that suddenly falling for the portrait reveals that a "need was there all along, awaiting its fulfilment in whatever form chance might provide" (85). This particular painting has exactly expressed the nature of being that Freddie most wants, and so least has. In a sense the picture is of him. The "love" he feels for the painted image is entirely narcissistic. The living woman, then, accidentally gets in the way of Freddie having himself as he most wants to be. In a way he kills her out of self-defense.
And yet her death changes everything, for what Freddie sees in the living woman's eyes silences the appeal of the portrait: just after killing the maid, with one last look he throws the painting into a ditch and walks away. Recalling in Ghosts the moment of "sudden access to another's being" when he looks into the maid's eyes, he says that "he had never known another creature-not mother, wife, child, not anyone-so intimately, so invasively, to such indecent depths, as he did just then this woman whom he was about to bludgeon to death" (86, 85-86). The crucial word that distinguishes what he has seen in the painting and what he sees in the woman is "another." With respect to the maid, he has mentioned "another's presence," "another's being," "another creature." In the painting, he sees, though he does not think of it this way, only himself. As he is about to kill the maid, he has his first experience of the essential self-presence of another person. But although Freddie suddenly apprehends the intimacy of another person's sense of being, he does not recognize the significance of what he has apprehended. At the end of The Book of Evidence Freddie himself offers an explanation of the "essential sin" in murdering the woman. The sin "for which there will be no forgiveness," he says, is "that I never imagined her vividly enough, that I never made her be there sufficiently, that I did not make her live. Yes, that failure of imagination is my real crime" (215). "I killed her," he continues, "because I could kill her, and I could kill her because for me she was not alive" (215). Obviously, "alive" in this sense involves more than just biology. Imagination, then, is that extra quality of understanding that can enable us to grasp the essential reality of another human being's unique alive-* CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE ness. So after the fact, when he has had time to consider the horror of his failure of imagination, he begins to have an updated version of the tragic insight about which Nietzsche wrote. What makes Banville's representation of all this in fact postNietzschean is that there is no mythification to be had, no invocation of dionysian or apollonian essences. Both the theft and the murder seem simply to happen. If it were left at this point, we would have another version of The Stranger, but Freddie, unlike Meursault, feels guilt and remorse. At the end of The Book of Evidence, he says that his "task now is to bring [the maid] back to life" (215). In Ghosts, still recalling these past events, he says that prison, "punishment, paying his debt to society, all that was nothing, was merely how he would pass the time while he got on with the real business of atonement, which was nothing less than the restitution of a life" (86). Ghosts is the story of this atonement, this restitution.
In Ghosts, Freddie, freed after ten years in jail, has sought refuge on an island. While in jail he had become an authority on Dutch painting, and he applies to become an assistant to a famous but reclusive art historian, Professor Kreutznaer, who lives on the island. The professor takes Freddie on, and Freddie moves into the house in which the professor and his secretary live. All this is told as a long flashback in the middle of the book. Most of the rest of the story involves the arrival on the island of a tour group whose boat has run aground.3 They end up spending the day at the professor's house, until the tide turns and they can refloat the boat. One member of the tour group, a woman named Flora, remains behind. The immediate present of the novel, the (impossible) point of time from which the whole tale is being told, occurs on the day in which she has revealed that she, too, is getting ready to leave.
The professor is a famous authority on the great, mysterious Freddie, after his time in jail, still sees the necessity of imagination, but given his sense of being an unanchored self, he cannot see how imagination is to work. Just here we have a key to his dilemma, and we can see the way nihilism on the one hand and postmodernism on the other arise out of the situation Nietzsche described in The Birth of Tragedy. Freddie is caught between two ideas of knowledge. In a way he knows this, and in a way he does not know it. He has described his own situation a number of times in both books, but without being able to grasp its significance. In The Book of Evidence, after becoming obsessed by the portrait, Freddie imagines a story to go with the painted woman: the story of how she came to be painted. In his imagination, when she sees the finished portrait of herself, she has a moment of disorientation: "She had expected it would be like looking in a mirror, but this is someone she does not recognize, and yet knows" (108). This is in fact a projected image of Freddie himself. He is constantly in the situation of knowing and yet not recognizing. We can see this in the way he doubts (in the quotation above) the possibility of someone such as himself being able to imagine others into life. He does not doubt himself because he is a murderer; he has thought of himself this way for most of his adult life. Something else is going on. On the one hand, he clearly knows his own "case." He gives us an accurate description of his own sense of self and the sense of knowledge and language that This contradictory state of mind can help us better understand Freddie's relationship with the portrait in The Book of Evidence. Seeing the portrait, Freddie is struck by a knowledge that falls outside the boundary of what can typically be considered knowledge, but his instant response is to possess the painting in just the way Socratic knowledge sets out to possess whatever appears to fall outside its established limits. Of course it is not that he wants to pull the painting into a formulated system of knowledge: unlike his predecessors, he has already given up on that, and in any case Banville is now exploring all this on a more everyday level. But the almost mindless craving to hold the painting to himself operates in the same manner. Freddie grasps the potent "thereness" of the painted image, but he cannot allow this most fully present "object" to exist outside the orbit of a center in himself, a center that he does not even know exists. Thus he seems to act spontaneously, obsessively. Just before he kills the maid, he fully realizes the otherness of a living self outside his own confused center, but in going on to kill her, he disallows that otherness. In both cases he has been suddenly opened to the knowledge that all Banville's protagonists have most wanted and, at the same moment, has violently shut down that knowledge.
Perhaps the largest-scale sign of this great contradiction appears in the different manner of telling the two stories. In The Book of Evidence Freddie lives a life on the boundary of the kind of knowledge that the conventional realistic novel both supports and is supported by, and yet he still employs that mode of narration-realism-to tell his story. In effect, the life he actually lives calls for a different narrative mode, a different net of art by which to catch his life's mysterious, uncatchable essence, in much the same way that Nietzsche's philosophical message required a different mode of philosophical discourse. The narrative net of Ghosts, like the narrative JACKSON * 527 form of all thoroughly postmodern literature (as well as certain postmodern philosophical writings) attempts to capture an existence that occupies the strange boundary-area defined by Nietzsche. It will necessarily fail, but it will fail in a significantly different way from how conventional realism fails, and with failure, as with knowing, it is the manner in which it is done that is important.
As knowledge and misrecognition came in the forms of a painting and a woman, so atonement and restitution will come in the forms of a painting and a woman. At the end of The Book of Evidence, after being in jail only a few weeks, Freddie has already begun studying Dutch painting, from biographies to histories to techniques, even to "the methods of grinding colours" and the like. . The "what we think" is of course a key phrase: since he no longer takes for granted the version of identity that he himself has never in fact experienced, he is no longer doomed to the misrecognitions that were explored in the previous book. We could say, in other words, that now he is not unconsciously judging a Nietzschean identity by the unrecognized standards of a Socratic identity.
In the end Freddie concludes that the painter has created "a world where nothing is lost, where all is accounted for while yet the mystery of things is preserved" (231). From this, again, we can see that it is not so much that the knowledge of art is opposed to or destroys scientific knowledge. The scientific desire, too, is that nothing be lost. But the "mystery of things" must be given up or ignored in order to produce certain kinds of knowledge, some very useful, some very destructive. Nor does art simply appear as the success in relation to science's failure. As Nietzsche himself points out, there is not "necessarily only an antipodal relation between Socratism and art" (Birth of Tragedy 92).
As Freddie's experience of the painting in Ghosts does not simply discredit the experience of the painting in The Book of Evidence, so his experience of the woman, Flora, does not somehow reverse or make up for the crime in the earlier book. Nonetheless, in the world Banville has created, it is as close to an atonement as can be expected. We know little of Flora, except that she is young, has been hired as a nanny for the two obnoxious boys who accompany her on the boat tour, and is being pursued by the sinister, Mephistophelean Felix, another member of the tour. She comes down with a fever as soon as she arrives and stays in bed alone all day. When it is time for the group to leave, she asks Freddie two things: if she can stay on at the house when the others leave, and if Felix, who has himself been talking of staying on, will in fact be going. Freddie says yes, and this modest guarantee of a shelter and safety becomes, for a man wracked with guilt and self-doubt, a monumental act. "Something had happened," he says. A "solemn warrant had been issued on me, and I felt more than ever like the hero in a tale of chivalry commanded to perform a task of rescue and reconciliation" (240). Flora remains for, as nearly as we can tell, a few weeks. Other than being temporary housemates, no relationship appears to develop between her and Freddie. In fact they have apparently hardly spoken until the morning of the present moment of the telling of the story, when the climactic event occurs.
The event is singularly unsingular and yet for Freddie means everything. Flora simply begins to talk with him at breakfast. Significantly, they speak of history. "What interested her was the same thing that interested me, namely.... 
